内容简介

“During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre”

Written during the turmoil of the English Civil War, Leviathan is an ambitious and highly original work of political philosophy. Claiming that man’s essential nature is competitive and selfish, Hobbes formulates the case for a powerful sovereign—or “Leviathan”—to enforce peace and the law, substituting security for the anarchic freedom he believed human beings would otherwise experience. This worldview shocked many of Hobbes’s contemporaries, and his work was publicly burnt for sedition and blasphemy when it was first published. But in his rejection of Aristotle’s view of man as a naturally social being, and in his painstaking analysis of the ways in which society can and should function, Hobbes opened up a whole new world of political science.

Based on the original 1651 text, this edition incorporates Hobbes’s own corrections, while also retaining the original spelling and punctuation, to read with vividness and clarity. C. B. Macpherson’s introduction elucidates one of the most fascinating works of modern philosophy for the general reader.

For more than seventy years, Penguin has been the leading publisher of classic literature in the English-speaking world. With more than 1,700 titles, Penguin Classics represents a global bookshelf of the best works throughout history and across genres and disciplines. Readers trust the series to provide authoritative texts enhanced by introductions and notes by distinguished scholars and contemporary authors, as well as up-to-date translations by award-winning translators.

作者简介

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was born in Malmesbury. Entering Magdalen Hall, Oxford, in 1603, he took his degree in 1608 and became tutor to the eldest son of Lord Cavendish of Hardwick, afterwards the Earl of Devonshire; his connection with this family was life-long. His first interest was in the classics, and his first published work a translation of Thucydides, in 1628. An inte...

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精彩摘录

eg：头脑中假想出的，或根据公开认可的传说构想出的对于不可见的力量的畏惧谓之宗教。所根据的如果不是公开认可的传说，便是迷信。当所想象的力量真正如我们所想象的一样时，便是真正的宗教。一个人心中对某一事物的欲望、嫌恶、希望与畏惧如果交替出现，做或不做这桩事情的各种好坏结果在思想中接连出现，以致有时想望这一事物、有时嫌恶这一事物；有时希望能做，有时又感到失望或害怕尝试；那么知道这一事物完成或被认为不可能时为止这一过程中的一切欲望、嫌恶、希望和畏惧的总和，便是我们所谓的斟酌。在斟酌之中，直接与行动或不行动相连的最后那种欲望或方案，便是我们所谓的意志。它是意愿的行为，而不是意愿的能力。兽类具有斟酌，便必然也具有意志。经院学派通常为意志提供的定义是理性的欲望，这个定义不好。因为如果是这样的话，便没有会违背理性的自愿行为了。因为自愿的行为不是别的，而是从意志中产生的行为。意志是斟酌中的最后一个欲望。在一般的讨论中，我们虽然说某人曾经一度有志于做某事，然而又没有做，不过恰当地说，这只是一种倾向，它并不能使任何行为成为自愿的；原因是行为并不取决于它，而只取决于最后的倾向或欲望。关于善与恶的的斟酌中所存在的是交替出现的欲望，关于过去与未来的真理的探讨中所存在的则是交替出现的意见。正如同斟酌中最后的欲望称为意志一样，过去与未来的真理的探讨中最后的意见就称为讨论者的判断、决断或最后断定。

——引自章节：《利维坦》

以上四个方面就是宗教的自然种子：（1）对鬼的看法；（2）对第二因的无知；（3）对所畏惧的事物的敬拜；（4）将偶然事物当作预兆。

——引自章节：《利维坦》