内容简介

The "New York Times" Bestseller, acclaimed by author such as Freakonomics co-author Steven D. Levitt, Black Swan author Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Nudge co-author Richard Thaler, "Thinking Fast and Slow" offers a whole new look at the way our minds work, and how we make decisions. Why is there more chance we'll believe something if it's in a bold type face? Why are judges more likely to deny parole before lunch? Why do we assume a good-looking person will be more competent? The answer lies in the two ways we make choices: fast, intuitive thinking, and slow, rational thinking. This book reveals how our minds are tripped up by error and prejudice (even when we think we are being logical), and gives you practical techniques for slower, smarter thinking. It will enable to you make better decisions at work, at home, and in everything you do.

作品目录

Introduction
Part I. Two Systems
1. The Characters of the Story
2. Attention and Effort
3. The Lazy Controller
4. The Associative Machine
5. Cognitive Ease
6. Norms, Surprises, and Causes
7. A Machine for Jumping to Conclusions
8. How Judgments Happen
9. Answering an Easier Question
Part II. Heuristics and Biases
10. The Law of Small Numbers
11. Anchors
12. The Science of Availability
13. Availability, Emotion, and Risk
14. Tom W's Specialty
15. Linda: Less is More
16. Causes Trump Statistics
17. Regression to the Mean
18. Taming Intuitive Predictions
Part III. Overconfidence
19. The Illusion of Understanding
20. The Illusion of Validity
21. Intuitions vs. Formulas
22. Expert Intuition: When Can We Trust It?
23. The Outside View
24. The Engine of Capitalism
Part IV. Choices
25. Bernoulli's Errors
26. Prospect Theory
27. The Endowment Effect
28. Bad Events
29. The Fourfold Pattern
30. Rare Events
31. Risk Policies
32. Keeping Score
33. Reversals
34. Frames and Reality
Part V. Two Selves
35. Two Selves
36. Life as a Story
37. Experienced Well-Being
38. Thinking About Life
Conclusions
Appendix A. Judgment Under Uncertainty
Appendix B. Choices, Values, and Frames
Notes
Acknowledgments
Index
· · · · · ·

作者简介

Daniel Kahneman is a Senior Scholar at Princeton University, and Emeritus Professor

of Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002.

精彩摘录

斯洛维克想摆脱专家对风险判断的绝对控制，因此他对专家的理论依据——风险是客观的——发起了挑战。“风险界定是一种权力运作。”

——引自章节：第13章焦虑情绪与风险政策的设计

对风险带有偏见的反应是导致公共政策中优先处理权不稳定和错位的重要原因。立法者和监管人员对民众的无理要求可能会反应过度，因为他们有着很强的政治敏感性，也因为他们和其他民众一样容易抱有同样的认知偏见。效用层叠（availabilitycascade）：有些情况下，关于某一风险的媒体报道能抓住部分公众的注意力，这部分注意力进而会变成激愤和焦虑。这种情感反应本身就是一种宣扬，会推动媒体跟进报道，继而会令人产生更大的焦虑，波及面也更大。这个循环有时候会因为那些专门负责连续不断地散布扰乱民心消息的个人或组织的刻意操纵而加速运行。媒体竞相制造吸引人眼球的头条新闻，危险也随之升级。一些科学家和其他领域的人士试图抑制这种日益增长的恐惧和厌恶情绪，然而收效甚微，非但没有达成初衷，反而激起了不少敌意：所有宣称危险有些夸大其词的人都有“欲盖弥彰”的嫌疑。我们的大脑解决小风险的能力有一个基本限度：我们要么完全忽视风险，要么过于重视风险，没有中间地带。……概率忽视和效用层叠两种社会机制的组合必然会导致对小威胁的夸大，有时还会引发严重后果。

——引自章节：第13章焦虑情绪与风险政策的设计