内容简介

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics at MIT.

作者简介

朱•弗登伯格(Drew Fudenberg)，哈佛大学经济系教授。1981年毕业于麻省理工学院，获得经济学博士学位，主要研究领域为博弈论和动态经济学。曾经在加州大学伯克利分校、麻省理工学院、斯坦福大学和法国图卢兹大学任教。从1982年至今，朱•弗登伯格教授一直是美国国家科学基金的主要负责人，1998年以来为美国计量经济学会委员会委员。主要著作有《博弈论》（与Jean Tirole合著）和《博弈学习理论》（与David K. Levine合著）。

让•梯若尔（JeanTirole），先后就读于法国理工学院，巴黎第九大学，1981年获美国麻省理工学院经济学博士学位。现担任法国图卢兹大学产业经济研究所科研所长，同时在巴黎大学，麻省理工学院担任兼职教授，并先后在哈佛大学、斯坦福大学担任客座教授。主要研究领域为博弈论，金融等。